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viewed as totally lacking in rational elements.1
That is, markets do reflect efforts of private agents
to look ahead, however imperfectly they may be
able to do so.2 And “looking ahead” certainly
includes forming expectations as to what policy-
makers will do.
My plan is to discuss some of the evolution
that has led to policy concern over central bank
communication. My perspective is primarily from
my own Federal Reserve experience. I know that
the topic has been extensively debated within and
without other central banks, but I do not have
enough systematic knowledge of these debates
to comment on issues outside the U.S. context.
I’ll discuss two aspects of central bank communi-
cation. One aspect is “body-language” communi-
cation through increased regularity of policy
actions and the second is written and oral com-
munication through policy statements, speeches
and testimony.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, but I retain full responsibility for errors.
CENTRAL BANK CREDIBILITY
There is a large literature on central bank
credibility. The literature arose quite naturally in
the context of the task of bringing inflation down
M
y short answer to the question
posed in the conference title is
“yes.” The fundamental issues
that created an enormous gulf
between macroeconomists in the 1960s have
been resolved. Of course, there are still things
to discuss, because agreement on the most impor-
tant fundamentals does not eliminate controversy
about many important details.
In the U.S context, the most important single
issue was that in 1965, say, economists conducted
modeling and policy exercises in a control-
theoretic framework. A changed view of expec-
tations led to appreciation of the importance of
the distinction between real and nominal interest
rates and the view that in the long run the Phillips
curve was vertical. Somewhat later but certainly
by 1985, say, almost everyone believed that expec-
tations of private agents about what policymakers
would do had to be incorporated in models and
policy analyses.
In 1965, expectations were almost uniformly
modeled in a backward-looking way. As the
rational expectations analysis took hold, the
argument concerned the extent of rationality in
formation of expectations. Were expectations
rational in the sense of Muth (1961) or were they
based on backward-looking and/or rules-of-thumb
calculations? I would not claim that there is a
consensus today on how to model expectations,
but would claim that all serious macroeconomists
believe that expectations cannot be adequately
1 An early important paper in this literature was Sargent and Wallace (1975).
2 If information is limited to the properties of a time series, then the rational expectation is the appropriate extrapolation of the past history of
the variable. The distinction is between a rational expectation, in the sense of the best guess given all available information, and a customary,
or habit-driven, extrapolation of history.from the excessive rates prevailing in most coun-
tries in the 1970s. Central banks had always been
concerned about credibility, but the importance
of that concern was elevated by the rational expec-
tations revolution in macroeconomics in the 1970s
and the unacceptably high rate of inflation.3
Analysis of credibility issues involved the
nature of appointments to governing boards of
central banks and the incentives central banks
face. As for incentives, there has long been recog-
nition of the importance of political independ-
ence, lest monetary policy be used to bolster the
electoral prospects of the party in power. The
Federal Reserve Act in 1913 was designed to create
considerable political independence. The argu-
ment on the other side, of course, was that in a
democracy policy decisions should be made by
elected officials or officials directly accountable
to elected officials; that view determined the
institutional design in many countries, including
the United Kingdom.
The issue was eventually decided in favor of
political independence largely, I think, on the
basis of experience. The relatively greater success
of more independent central banks—Deutsche
Bundesbank, Swiss National Bank and Federal
Reserve System—convinced many observers that
substantial political independence was the better
institutional design for democratic countries.
In any event, the growing conviction of
macroeconomists that the rational expectations
model needed to be taken seriously provided a
powerful analytical base for discussing central
bank credibility. Also, economists recognized
that the cost of bringing inflation down might
depend importantly on the extent of credibility.
In models in which inflation expectations were
merely extrapolations from past inflation, reduc-
ing inflation would require a predictable period
of pain. To bring actual inflation down, the central
bank had to create a recession. The recession
would reduce inflation which in turn would
gradually reduce inflation expectations, setting
the base for renewed economic growth at a low
rate of inflation.
Credibility and forward-looking expectations
promised to reduce the pain. Nevertheless, the
United States and the United Kingdom both suf-
fered significant recessions in the early 1980s. I
remember a comment I made in 1981 to one of my
more hard-line rational expectations colleagues:
Given the Federal Reserve’s behavior over the
previous 15 years, it was not rational to assign a
high probability to the Fed’s promises, even under
the new Chairman, Paul Volcker, to bring infla-
tion down. In the event, it was the Fed’s willing-
ness, supported by President Reagan despite a
severe recession, to sustain a policy to reduce
inflation that created credibility. The Fed’s policy
more than anything it said built credibility.
Central bank credibility is an aspect of the
broader issue of trust. Credibility and trust, once
lost, can be extremely expensive to regain. I
believe that most policymakers recognize this
fact, and the recognition has much to do with
efforts to enhance transparency to build trust.
POLICY RULES
There is a large literature on rules versus dis-
cretion in monetary policy, dating from the sem-
inal paper by Henry Simons (1936). The rational
expectations revolution reinforced the case for
rules. In the models spawned by this revolution,
monetary policy was generally specified by a
money growth rule. This approach worked well
in the models, but left a void for monetary policy-
makers because central banks did not implement
policy through money growth targets. There is
controversy over the extent of money growth tar-
geting by the Bundesbank, but for the United
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3 Credibility was a critically important issue for the Federal Reserve in 1979 as it decided to change policy dramatically to bring down inflation.
See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2005).
4 The FOMC began setting a target for borrowed reserves in 1982. My view is that this target was a funds rate target at one remove, because
bank borrowing at the discount window depends on money market interest rates. Also, pursuit of the borrowing target was tempered by the
behavior of the funds rate. Put another way, open market operations were designed in part to prevent the federal funds rate from departing
too widely from expectation. For all practical purposes, I believe, the FOMC was operating on a federal funds target after August 1982.States the practice was clear. Except for the period
from October 1979 to September 1982, the Federal
Reserve did not pursue a monetary aggregates
policy but instead implemented policy through
adjustments in its target for the federal funds rate.4
Of course, observed money growth did affect the
fed funds rate targets from time to time, but so
also did many other variables.
For a time, therefore, macroeconomists were
in the uneasy position of constructing models
closed by a money growth rule when they knew
that the Fed did not pursue policy this way. In
1993 John Taylor showed that it is possible to
model Fed behavior by using a simple equation
that makes the target fed funds rate a function of
the real interest rate, the gap between the actual
and desired inflation rate, and the gap between
actual and potential real GDP.
The Taylor rule fit experience pretty well,
and continued to do so after 1993. Some version
of the rule became the standard way of closing
macroeconomic models. Nevertheless, because
the Federal Reserve has not followed the Taylor
rule closely, or any variant of it or other rule,
there remained and remains today a gap between
what the Federal Reserve actually does and the
notion of a policy rule embedded in the abstract
models.
Federal Reserve policy is much more rule-like
than commonly appreciated. I have discussed
this issue at some length in two recent speeches.
In the first, I argued in some detail that Fed policy
has become highly predictable, as measured by
the accuracy of predictions in the federal funds
futures market.5 In the second, I argued that pre-
dictability is evidence of rule-like policy. I detailed
some of the characteristics of policy behavior
that are indeed highly predictable. One example
is the Fed’s analysis of the significance of statis-
tical data based on detailed information that helps
to distinguish transitory disturbances, to which
the Fed ought not and does not respond, from
genuinely new information to which the Fed
should and does respond.6
INFLATION TARGETING
The Taylor rule assumes a specified inflation
target. Ambiguity over the target has been reduced
by adoption of a formal inflation target by many
central banks. A substantial literature on inflation
targeting now exists.7 The literature covers not
only the issue of what target to set and the advan-
tages of having a target but also policy under an
inflation target. The consensus is that the formal
inflation target helps to inform the public about
the central bank’s objective but that policy should
not be a slave to the target. Particularly in the
United States where the Federal Reserve Act
contains a dual mandate specifying goals of
maximum employment as well as price stability,
policymakers cannot pursue the price stability
goal to the neglect of everything else.
In the United States, and I believe elsewhere
as well, opinion is pretty settled that employment
and price stability goals are not competitive but
fundamentally complementary. Success in main-
taining low and stable inflation contributes to
economic stability, maximizes economic growth
and creates conditions that permit the labor
market to clear at the highest possible level of
employment. Of course, that level is determined
importantly by nonmonetary conditions that fall
outside the central bank’s direct area of responsi-
bility. Also important, however, is that low infla-
tion and high credibility permit the central bank
to respond constructively to real and financial
disturbances without raising inflation fears. With
high credibility, the central bank can reduce the
variance of the real economy.
Although the Federal Reserve has not
announced a numerical inflation target, Ben
Bernanke, the nominee to become Fed chairman




7 Two convenient source are: Bernanke and Woodford (2005) and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2004).in February, is on record favoring such a target.
Although I am also on record favoring a formal
numerical target, I believe the issue has not been
a large one in the United States. Many observers
believe that the Fed has been pursuing an infla-
tion target range of 1 to 2 percent annual rate of
increase of the core PCE price index. If the Fed
does adopt a formal target in the future, I doubt
very much that statistical tests for a regime break
would be able to find one in an economic series





A rational expectations equilibrium requires
that the market have information about the Fed’s
policy rule. The more accurate is that information,
the more efficient will be economic outcomes.
The market learns about the rule above all from
what the Fed does. Actual monetary policy has
been highly successful, and that is what has
built credibility. Regularities in pursuing policy
have made policy more predictable, in the sense
that conditional on new information the market
has a good idea of the Fed’s response, if any, to
the new information.
Although predictable policy—the body lan-
guage—is the most important feature of the cur-
rent situation, improved policy communication
has also played a significant role. Perhaps the
most important step the FOMC has taken to
improve policy communications was the release
of the policy decision immediately following
each FOMC meeting, starting in February 1994.
Other steps, such as more timely release of min-
utes of FOMC meetings, have been helpful.9
I believe that there is a consensus that better
communication furthers the goal of informing
the markets more completely about the course of
monetary policy, enabling market participants to
make more efficient decisions. The issue is not
with the principle of better communication, but
how to be more effective. I have discussed some
of the difficulties in a speech I entitled “Fed
Transparency: How, Not Whether” (Poole, 2003).
As every central banker knows and has most
likely experienced, communication is difficult
because it is so easy to be misunderstood. Mis-
communication adds uncertainty and creates
market volatility. In a formal, rational expectations
model such uncertainty can be modeled by adding
a random term to the market’s understanding of
the policy rule. I know of no model in which
adding stochastic disturbances to the policy rule
improves outcomes for inflation, employment
and growth.
Increased attention to communication has a
benefit that is frequently overlooked—an improve-
ment in the clarity of internal deliberations. In a
committee context, explicit understanding of
policy goals and agreement on policy direction
must precede public communication. We need
to know what we want to say before we try to say
it. I had a vivid lesson in this regard when I first
came to my current position. In 1998, the FOMC
was agreeing on a policy “tilt” or “bias” and I dis-
covered that different members of the Committee
had different interpretations of what the bias
meant.
The most important communications issue
facing the FOMC currently is whether and how to
continue to provide forward guidance on policy
decisions. Starting in mid-2003, the policy state-
ment at the conclusion of the FOMC meeting
stated that “...policy accommodation can be main-
tained for a considerable period.” Later, the Com-
mittee said that it could be “patient in removing
its policy accommodation.” Still later, the Com-
mittee said that it would remove accommodation
at a “measured pace.”
Even when the federal funds rate was at 1
percent, unpredictable events could have occurred
8 Woodford (2005) provides an excellent recent discussion of communications issues.
9 For a full list of such steps, see Poole (2005a).
MONETARY POLICY AND INFLATION
4that would have led the Committee to depart
from its forward guidance. The setting of policy
must be conditional on information at hand, and
when information changes sufficiently the policy
setting must also change. Historically, the Federal
Reserve has not provided forward guidance for
fear that it would lock itself into a policy stance
that might, under new information, no longer be
appropriate. In principle, there is no reason why
the Fed cannot explain the nature of the condi-
tionality and convey the view that policy guidance
depends on information available at the time
guidance is offered.
Putting aside the unusual circumstances that
took the federal funds rate to 1 percent, for me
the issue is whether under normal and routine
circumstances forward guidance will convey
information or whether it will create additional
uncertainty. If conditionality of policy is under-
stood, then events that lead the FOMC to depart
from previously stated forward guidance should
not cause difficulty. The market will understand
that guidance is not a promise that must be kept
to retain credibility but instead a way of summa-
rizing the Committee’s view of the probable direc-
tion of policy. Then, when unexpected events
move policy a different way, markets will come
to the same conclusion about the policy signifi-
cance of an unexpected event as does the FOMC.
SUMMARY
In the context of today’s understanding of
how the economy works—an understanding
based on rational expectations models—policy
communication is an essential aspect of monetary
policy. Private agents make more efficient deci-
sions when they understand monetary policy. Of
course, the same argument holds for other policies,
such as fiscal and regulatory ones. Clarity requires
that policy have rule-like characteristics. Indeed,
a research agenda improving the specificity of
the monetary policy rule is highly desirable.
Federal Reserve policy practice and policy
discussion has done much to improve the pre-
dictability of Fed policy decisions over the past
decade or so. I believe that there is a consensus
that improved predictability has improved the
effectiveness of monetary policy. This consensus
in turn is fundamentally a consequence of the
consensus in the economics profession that the
right way to think about the macro economy is
in the context of a rational expectations macro
model. Expectations may not be fully rational, but
that is still the right starting point for analyzing
the economy and monetary policy.
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